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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the Software Defined Networking (SDN) security experiment on Zeus Botnet attacks based 
on traffic behavior in the network. The development of SDN technology is increasingly in demand today, both on the 
researcher and industry side. This is inseparable from the SDN feature that gives the developer the flexibility to program 
the system inside. But on the other hand, the development of network technology cannot be separated from the threat of 
attack, especially Botnet attacks. Botnets are able to take control of the SDN network by attacking the control plane. This is 
possible when the botmaster enters a third party into the network and infects the associated device in the SDN network as a 
bot. This problem is categorized as Integrity in CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) used in the 
evaluation of security performance. Integrity in the CIA triad is a state of information that is always accurate and consistent 
until a recognized user makes a change. At the end of this paper will be explained about future research based on 
experimental test results. 
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INTRODUCTION 
SDN [1] [2] [3] as the development of new 
technologies in the network has an important role in the 
centralized network configuration, control, and operation 
network. SDN can strengthen the network architecture, 
cost efficiency, and provide opportunities for application 
and network functionality by improving the software 
system [4]. SDN is not well known by the security 
community [4]. As an evidence of this statement, the 
number of SDN research papers on the security field is 
much less than in the improvement of network 
performance. in 2017, there is still less attention from a 
security researcher [4]. 
On the other side, SDN has potential to be 
attacked along with technological development. Botnet 
attack is one type of attack that became the main threat to 
the traditional network that has a chance to become a 
dangerous threat in SDN. Botnets are able to take control 
of the plane on the SDN, this has an impact on the 
integrity factor, Integrity is one of CIA (Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Availability) Triad component that used as 
security parameter for network security. Integrity in CIA 
triad is a condition where information is kept accurate and 
consistent unless authorize changes are made. 
To overcome this problem will be tested botnet 
detection based on traffic properties on the network using 
sFlow. There are different characteristics of normal traffic 
and botnet-affected traffic; this is because the size of the 
data packet communication between bots and botmasters 
tends to remain different from normal traffic that tends to 
be random. 
 
SDN feature 
SDN provide benefit with four features that 
divided as follow: 
a) Dynamic flow control 
SDN has the capability to dynamically control 
data flow, with this feature SDN data flow can be 
controlled efficiently. Malicious network packets flow can 
be divided from authorized flows without setting up new 
middle boxes and it can be done with network device only. 
PBS (Programmable BYOD Security) [5] is an example of 
this feature, it grantsaccess operator for establishing and 
set up virtual Software Define Network. 
 
b) Integrate control with extensive visibility 
Supervise and manage the overall network to get 
all status of network and data flow.NetSecVisor [6] has 
the ability to utilize security devices and affect SDN 
function to be virtualized. 
 
c) Network with programmability 
Network function on SDN control plane can be 
programmed by Application Programming Interfaces 
(APIs) [7]. This feature makes network security 
development become easier by the setup program for 
security application. One of these feature examples is 
FRESCO [8]. 
 
d) Simple data package 
Not like as in traditional network, SDN divided 
control and data plane. This feature makes SDN data plane 
become simpler and open opportunity for adding data 
plane extension for security function. OFX (Open Flow 
Extension Framework) [9] is an example of this feature, 
OFX has the ability to enable SDN security application 
with existing OpenFlow. 
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Figure-1. Botnet terminology [21]. 
 
Botnet overview 
As defined before, Botnet is a collection of the 
computer that controlled by hackers. Botnets are divided 
into 3 main cycles in the way its phase of infection, C & C 
communication phase, and phase of the attack. [10] [11] 
[12]. Differences botnet than other types of attacks is the 
existence of C & C that work in giving orders from 
botmaster to bot. Bots always hide while looking for an 
unattended target, when bot find the target they will report 
to the botmaster [13]. Figure-1 shows the botnet 
terminology in general, some of which will be explained 
in the next explanation. 
 
Architecture Botnet 
Botmastermanages their C&C (Command and 
Control) to communicate with their bot indirectly in 
purpose to hide the C&C architecture. There arefour 
topologies on Botnet attack described as follow: 
 
A. Botnet IRC 
Figure-2 shows the Botnet attack scheme through 
IRC, IRC is a text message sent over the internet [14]. The 
protocol works based on the model of the client-server that 
is used on computers in a distributed network. The 
advantages of using IRC protocol on botnet are: 
a) Has a low latency on the communication side 
 
b) Real-time communication is done covertly 
 
c) Have the ability to work in groups and in pairs 
 
d) Easy to set up 
 
e) Simple command instruction, basic command consists 
of, commands to connect to the server, post messages 
in the channel. 
 
f) Communication run flexibly 
  
Figure-2. Botnet IRC [15]. 
 
B. Botnet HTTP 
Since the use of IRC Botnets has been 
recognized, researchers are beginning to focus on tracking 
the whereabouts of IRC botnets. Therefore, the attacker 
initiated the use of HTTP Botnet which can be seen from 
Figure-3, in this way the botnet becomes hard to find. 
 
 
 
Figure-3. HTTP Botnet [10]. 
 
This is because the botnet uses the HTTP 
protocol to hide the existence of its bot in web traffic, so 
botnets can easily bypass the firewall using a port-based 
filtering mechanism and avoid detection from IDS. Under 
normal circumstances, the firewall will block both 
incoming traffic and outbound traffic to unwanted ports 
which include IRC ports. Several examples of HTTP 
botnet are Rustock, Zeus, Bobax, and ClickBot. 
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C. Decentralized / peer to peer (P2P) C&C server 
The next development on botnet topology is 
decentralized C&C, this development is done because the 
centralized botnet has been recognized and resolved by the 
researcher. In decentralized botnets, attackers use P2P 
communication systems as a pattern of C&C, which in 
turn provides an advantage in avoiding network failures 
[12]. Every bot in this topology has limited size and 
periodically every bot connects to a neighbor to receive a 
command from botmaster. So Botmaster in this topology 
only needs to connect with one bot to send command. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-5. Hybrid P2P Botnet [13]. 
 
Zeus Botnet 
 
Figure-4. Peer to peer C&C server [13]. 
 
Figure-4 shows the absence of a centralized point 
in communication, each bot keeping in touch with other       
bots. On the other hand, the bot also acts as a client and 
server in forwarding information. The newly infected bot 
must know the other botnet connected to it. If the bot in 
the botnet is offline, other bots can continue operations 
under the botmaster command. 
 
D. Hybrid 
The next development of P2P botnet is Hybrid 
P2P botnet which can be seen from Figure-5 [16], bot on 
this type is classified 2 categories as follows: 
 
a) Servant Bots - the first category referred to as servant 
bots, the bot acts as a client and server, which has 
static, routable IP addresses and is easily accessible 
from the rest of the internet. 
b) Client Bots - Bots in the second category act as clients 
because they do not accept incoming connections 
[28]. This category contains the remaining bots as 
follows: 
 
1) Bots with dynamic IP addressing properties 
2) Bots with fixed route IP address 
3) Bots that work behind a firewall, they cannot be 
connected to the global internet. 
 
 
Figure-6. Zeus Botnet communication system [20]. 
 
Zeus Botnet is one type of HTTP-based botnet. 
Figure 6 shows the communication pattern between the C 
& C server with the infected machine, here is an 
explanation of the communication pattern: 
 
a) The infected client starts the process by sending a Get 
/config.bin request to the C&C server. The 
configuration is a botnet configuration file. 
b) C&C server reply request with config.bin that has 
been previously encrypted. 
c) Bots receive messages and encrypt using encryption 
keys from within the binary bot file. 
d) When the botmaster sets up the botnet, the infected 
machine will provide an external IP address and 
provide reports on the use of Network Address 
Translation (NAT). 
e) Bot reports status to C&C server Post/gate .php 
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The entire process above is done with the same 
packet size every time, so it can be used as a detection 
parameter of the existence of botnet that will be described 
in the next section. 
 
Botnet detection 
Any traffic that goes into control plane on SDN 
will be captured to be used in detecting the presence of 
botnet based on the incoming and outgoing traffic between 
host and switch. 
 
Figure-9. h2 (Bot) to h1 traffic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-7. Botnet detection parameters. 
 
In the botnet detection approach, there are several 
ways of determining it, among them is based on DNS, 
Signature, Anomaly, and Machine Learning [17] [18] [19] 
as shown in Figure-1. Figure-7 represents botnet detection 
based on the nature of traffic or can be said as a way of 
detection based on anomaly traffic. The size of data 
transmitted in communication between bots and 
botmasters tends to be fixed, in contrast to the size of the 
data transmitted normally within the network. 
 
RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
 
Figure-10. h3 (Bot) to h1 traffic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-11. h4 (User) to h1 traffic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOT (h3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-8. Botnet detection. 
Figure-9 shows traffic monitoring results on the 
communication traffic between host and switch based on 
characteristic botnet communication. Application of botnet 
attacks is done directly through the xterm command on the 
mininet terminal. 
The x-axis represents the size of packets sent 
between computers to the server, whereas the y-axis is the 
timeframe for communication to occur. Based on the test 
results shown in Figures 9 and 10, there is an increase in 
the traffic each command to the bot is sent. Whereas in h4 
uninfected botnets, traffic is random and there is no 
Figure-8 shows the scheme used in botnet 
detection testing experiments on SDN. The scheme 
consists of 3 computers (h2, h3, h4) connected with SDN 
Server (h1) and Botmaster. Computers h2 and h3 have 
been infected by botmaster and act as bots, h1 acts as a 
switch on the SDN server, while h4 is a computer that has 
not been infected by botmaster. 
sudden increase in the magnitude of traffic. So it can be 
concluded that the existence of botnets can be seen when 
there is a sudden increase in traffic and patterned the same. 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Botnets are an important threat to the SDN 
communication system because they are able to take 
control of the plane that is a vital part of the SDN. In this 
Network Traffic 
BOT (h2) What’s Current 
Command? 
Command 
Legitimate User (h4) 
SDN Control 
Plane 
What’s Current 
Command? 
Command 
Zeus Botnet 
Generator 
BOTMASTER 
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paper has been discussed how the botnet works and how to 
detect its existence. In addition, botnet detection 
experiments have been conducted based on traffic 
behavior. Based on the experiments conducted, the 
existence of botnets can be identified based on sudden and 
patterned increase in traffic. But on the other hand, this is 
just one simple way of detecting botnets, it needs to be re- 
developed a more complex detection method because there 
is a chance of similarity in traffic size between bots and 
users over time. The development can be the application 
of methods of botnet detection on the traditional network 
by adjusting the increase in the SDN by providing certain 
programs. 
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